Netz 21 – The Network Strategy of Deutsche Bahn (September 2008)

Translation of the Core Statements of NP's Paper on the German Railroads Network Strategy

Chapters 1 and 2:
DB is not a logistics group; it is predominantly a railway group.
Within the DB railway group, the railway network contributes just as much to creating added value as the operation of trains on it does. The network’s significance in this regard will even increase in future.
This means that any rail reform will have to start with the network – the railway’s core asset.

Chapter 3:
The prerequisites for any railway network to be successful are efficient investment, efficient management and efficient marketing.
The present report deals with efficient investments into the railway network. But there is an internal connection to the marketing efforts made (the so-called “track exchange”). The market for tracks is the right place to obtain information as to what should be modernised and expanded, and where, when and how this should be done.

Chapter 4:
The network we have in the Federal Republic of Germany is a paradox: it is chronically under-utilised, in spite of many bottlenecks. The increased use of the network cannot be the cause. In the past nine years, track kilometres (train kilometres) have increased at a rate of a mere 1% per annum.

Chapter 5:
It is not only DB, but also the other stakeholders, the federal government and the Länder (the federal states of Germany), who are drunk on high speed.
Leaving aside a few exceptions (such as the Berlin-Wolfsburg route), all high-speed (HGV) projects are embarrassing flops, their cost-to-benefit ratio ranging somewhere between “bad” and “beyond awful”. There is no learning curve that would enable greater efficiency to be developed (the lessons of predecessor projects have gone unheeded).
In view of the demand that the railway system will have to meet in future (demographics, explosion of freight traffic across Europe, price sensitivity of most passengers), the continued fixation on high-speed train connections is becoming more and more insane.

Chapter 6:
This fixation on high-speed trains, and thus the forced relegation of freight traffic, is clearly a self-defeating exercise in view of the worsening energy shortage, which will entail drastic price increases (that will hit also the conversion into electricity, not just petroleum). The objectives thus far will need to be turned around entirely: we will need to ensure continuity in operations at reasonable speed. And if the travel or transport speed (source to target) absolutely needs to be increased, there are more cost effective means of achieving that.

Chapter 7:
In 1995, DB attempted to break out of the general high-speed fixation and developed the “Netz 21” strategy for its railway network. This failed. DB itself was divided on the issue. Theo Waigel, the then Minister of Finance, chairman of the Christian Social Union (CSU, Bavarian affiliate of the Christian Democratic Union) and member of the German parliament representing the city of Neu-Ulm (on the “Heimerl-Track” connecting Stuttgart and Ulm, which was supposed to be cancelled at the time) had supreme power over Deutsche Bahn at the time – and was exceptionally interested in bringing prestige railway projects to Bavaria.

Chapter 8:
The misery that high-speed fixation was going to cause was evident as early as in 1995. Only the label “Netz 21” continued, otherwise, nothing changed.
The result of this “same-old same-old” is that the German rail network is a mess of investments begun but not completed. Questioning them brings to light only ludicrous items – as illustrated by the examples in Chapter 8: from “separate tunnel tubes” to “cost-benefit ratio”.

Chapter 9:
In view of the complexity and the various conflicting interests of the federal government, the Länder and Deutsche Bahn, all of the fresh starts since 1995 have had one thing in common: they have made sure to create the highest degree of annoyance wherever possible.
There is the risk that while everything will remain chaotic, this chaos will steadily increase.
Only the federal government can take the initiative for a new beginning (according to the German Constitution, it is the owner and party under obligation to maintain the network, it is the guarantor of public order and, last but not least, the entity responsible for granting subsidies).

Chapter 10:
Accepting the fact that there is chaos, and taking leave of ingrained convictions that in fact caused this chaos, will require that a concept be created in the near term for developing the network in the next two decades, especially if DB is to make do with whatever funds the federal government is able to provide. Only if these two factors are juxtaposed and balanced will the necessary impetus grow (hopefully) to cancel large projects. We recommend that a competition of ideas be initiated. Until then, decisions will need to be taken as to which investments are to be continued (and perhaps even enhanced) and which should be put an end to immediately (moratorium).

Chapter 11:
Netz 21 and the railway reform have an internal connection. The reform is to be brought to an end such that the responsibility for the network is clearly recognizable, and is no longer lost in the Bermuda Triangle of carelessness made up of the federal government, the Länder and Deutsche Bahn.